Incident reporting, aviation and anaesthesia
Too many patients are harmed by healthcare intended to help them 1 . Anaesthesia, an essential component of healthcare, is thought to have become very safe in recent years-at least in high income countries. Indeed, anaesthetists are often held up as leaders in the pursuit of patient safety. It is easy to forget that this was not always the case: a seminal paper by Macintosh, drawing attention to basic failures in anaesthetic practice that were then contributing to avoidable deaths, is worth reading 2 . Macintosh's paper is surprisingly forthright and honest, and was an early example of the importance of learning from mistakes in healthcare 2 . We have certainly made progress since then, but there is no room for complacency. The NAP4 3 and NAP5 4 publications are timely reminders that serious complications do still occur in anaesthesia today, and that they often involve relatively healthy individuals undergoing apparently straightforward surgical procedures under the care of well-trained anaesthetists. We (as anaesthetists) may be generic leaders in patient safety, but there is still much for us to learn about safety in our own specialty. The need to continue learning and improving is the primary reason for reporting and reviewing incidents.
There are other reasons too. The process of reporting and reviewing incidents in healthcare has an important declarative function: it provides a degree of transparency and makes clear to patients, hospital administrators, regulators and the profession that patient safety matters. It is also one of the ways that we, as practitioners, can (and should) respond when we are concerned about some aspect of the care of one of our patients. It is understandable that conscientious practitioners may suffer considerable anxiety and anguish when a patient is injured, or even when a near miss occurs. Perfection is not attainable, and denial is not functional at any level-whether from the perspective of systems safety or from the perspective of the psychological health of the practitioner. It can be therapeutic as well as appropriate to document the incident, to reflect on why it occurred and to review the underlying factors with our colleagues. This of course hinges on the presence of a culture that ensures the safety of those who report.
Departmental review processes can achieve all of these functions, but can only promote learning locally. Causal factors in the system may be identified that should be addressed to reduce the risk of occurrence. These factors may or may not be relevant beyond the boundaries of the institution in which the incident occurred. Amalgamation of incident reports from many units facilitates the identification of generalisable messages and of rare but recurring problems with new equipment or drugs. Dissemination of these messages to the profession as a whole is also important.
Parallels are often drawn between aviation and anaesthesia, so it is interesting to reflect on what can be learnt from incident reporting in aviation. Accidents may manifest as major disasters in aviation. It is not surprising, therefore, that (in most countries) the aviation industry has a very formal and precise investigation process that is activated once a major incident occurs, whether it was a publicly apparent near miss or an actual accident 5 . There are similarities with the detailed root cause analyses that are sometimes undertaken after serious events in healthcare, but there is greater consistency of approach within aviation, and much more emphasis on timeliness, on distributing the findings promptly among the industry internationally, and on implementing recommendations globally to ensure the correct practices or technical improvements are put in place to prevent the re-occurrence of the same event in the future.
Disasters are rare in commercial aviation, and even serious incidents are relatively unusual. This means that more common sources of information are needed for timely and ongoing learning, proactively, before disaster occurs. Near misses and minor incidents are very common, and many of these would go unnoticed if no-one reported them. The chain of events that leads to a near miss is often the same as the chain of events that leads to a serious accident, and the underlying cause may often also be the same 6 . Heinrich captured this general idea in the 1940s in the well-known concept of the safety pyramid 7 . Thus, in aviation, the value of reporting minor incidents and near misses by individuals in the system has received great emphasis. These reports provide a rich source of information for developing ways to avoid the repetition of similar events and their escalation into major accidents.
An important impediment to reporting is fear of retribution. Over the past decades the aviation industry has moved through a number of iterations in its efforts to find an approach that encourages reporting and also optimises the aim of improving safety. The starting point was a legal requirement for reporting. Some organisations provided ways to keep reports confidential, but individuals were named and it became apparent that the associated risk of prosecution or discipline served to inhibit participation in this process, even though it was theoretically mandatory. As the industry matured, anonymous reporting was introduced to remove this barrier to the provision of information on near misses and incidents. However, there were unintended consequences. For example, anonymity allowed some Editorial individuals to report from malicious motivations rather than in the interests of safety, and more generally it was not possible to verify the details and accuracy of the reports, or to obtain more information from the reporters if this was needed for a deeper understanding of the event.
Thus, protected and/or confidential reporting became the norm within a voluntary framework to enable and encourage aircrew to report near misses and close calls in the knowledge that they would not be persecuted or disciplined in any way. An example of this is the American ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) which is run by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the US. NASA serves as an independent party in the process, which offers immunity from legal proceedings to those who report in a timely manner. Unfortunately, this system also has unintended consequences-namely that it may protect those who exhibit unacceptable behaviours.
Hence the development of the Just Culture paradigm 6, 8, 9 . A Just Culture is one in which the approach to accountability distinguishes the inevitable failures that occur in complex systems that include humans from more infrequent events that may justifiably be considered blameworthy 10 . The approach is not binary, and sanctions should reflect the circumstances. Normal human error that is openly disclosed should be encouraged, and no blame should follow, but a proportionate element of sanction may apply where there has been some deliberate failing to follow expected processes or procedures associated with safety. Algorithms have been developed to capture these distinctions 6 , but in reality, it can often be difficult to evaluate the moral culpability associated with particular events 10 and there is a strong argument for a parallel process in which incidents can be reported anonymously without generating immunity for the reporter, but also without incurring risk.
Nevertheless, the airline industry has moved to a stronger emphasis on accountability within a framework of a Just Culture. Incident reporting has been combined with real-time electronic tracking of information about such things as each aircraft's configuration, performance, speed and position. These data are downloaded to ground servers, usually daily, and are then scanned for "exceedances"-measurements that fall outside limits defined by the airline 11 . Where an exceedance is identified, the voluntary reports filed by pilots are cross-checked to see if the event has been reported. One of the most egregious errors a pilot can make is held to be the failure to report an incident or safety-related event. In this way, the organisation can obtain some indication of the proportion of incidents that are reported over time, and can identify and follow up possible incidents that have not been reported but should have been. This impressively comprehensive and integrated approach to managing incidents, near misses and accidents provides a model from which healthcare has learned and can continue to learn. How does incident reporting in anaesthesia in Australia and New Zealand compare?
Runciman is the father of bi-national incident reporting in anaesthesia in Australia and New Zealand, but it was Cooper who first introduced critical incident monitoring into anaesthesia [12] [13] [14] [15] , drawing from work in other fields 16, 17 .
It is interesting that, from the outset, Runciman appears to have envisaged a comprehensive approach to improving patient safety in healthcare generally. His first move was to found the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF) in 1988 18 . This followed the US example of E.C. (Jeep) Pierce Jr who (with Cooper, J.S. Gravenstein and others) founded the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation in 1985, with the vision "that no patient shall be harmed from anesthesia" 15 . Notably, however, the Australian foundation's title does not restrict its activities to anaesthesia.
From this base, Runciman launched the Anaesthetic Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) 19 , which gained considerable traction and led to many publications with recommendations that have contributed substantially to improving the safety of anaesthesia. The reports were anonymous, and the system was paper-based. One of its key strengths was its craft orientation. It enabled incident reporting by anaesthetists to improve anaesthesia care-its relevance was palpable and motivating. Its success facilitated maturation into a more comprehensive approach to all incidents in healthcare, within a universal framework of classification 20 . However, with this laudable development, the focus on anaesthesia seemed to lose some momentum, and reporting declined. This led to the decision to form the Australian and New Zealand Tripartite Data Committee (ANZTADC)-representatives of its three parent organisations, the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists, the Australian Society of Anaesthetists and the New Zealand College of Anaesthetists signed a memorandum of understanding at Ulimaroa, in Melbourne, on 6 September 2006. The mission of ANZTADC was clear:
To improve the quality and safety of anaesthesia for patients in Australia and New Zealand by providing an enduring capability to capture, analyse and disseminate information about incidents (de-identified) relative to the safety and quality of anaesthesia in Australia and New Zealand. A steering committee was established, and Dr Martin Culwick was appointed (part-time) as medical director. Advances in information technology made an easilyused web-based application possible. It was decided that anonymous reports should be allowed as an option, and that all reports should be de-identified. A more limited taxonomy, relevant to anaesthesia, was developed, based on elements of the original AIMS, the Swiss Critical Incident Reporting System, and the British National Patient Safety Agency's incident reporting system. The importance of narrative had become clear in the AIMS work, so a narrative section was included. Work was done to understand and address laws and other issues related to ethics, privacy and publication of data. The result was WebAIRS.
Regular reports have been published through the newsletters of the parent organisations and through presentations at national and international meetings. By June 2016, over 4,000 incident reports had been collected from 127 registered sites, and these have been cleansed for analysis and the subsequent publication of a series of articles in the Journal. Papers providing an overview 21 , an analysis of factors associated with harm 22 and an evaluation of a novel approach to analysis using the Bowtie diagram have been published 23 . Further publications are in preparation by various authors on medication errors, awareness under anaesthesia, aspiration, anaphylaxis and other topics.
Importantly, the local review of incidents is a central expectation of participants in WebAIRS. Colleagues within departments learn from one another's mistakes, and the stories underlying incident reports are often also highly motivational. WebAIRS facilitates local review, the amalgamation of reports at the bi-national level, and the promulgation of lessons learned between institutions across both countries. Other countries have also adopted webbased incident reporting. There is close liaison between WebAIRS and the US system 24 , which opens up the potential for a more international sharing of key messages.
Incident reporting is only one element of advancing patient safety. In our region, the cornerstones of safe practice are the excellence of our training and continued professional development, the high levels of sophisticated and modern equipment and drugs that we use, and the overall maturity of the healthcare systems in which we work. We have come a long way from the days of Macintosh's publication, through an ongoing commitment to the principles of continuous quality improvement. Incident reporting informs and motivates other approaches to improving the safety of our patients. Failure Mode Effect Analysis is a proactive technique that is gaining traction in healthcare 25 . The idea of learning from success as well as from failure has been captured in the name "Safety-II" 26 . The use of simulation to study human factors and improve teamwork and communication in the operating room 27 is well established in anaesthesia.
The early gains from AIMS were striking, but equally striking initiatives are becoming harder to identify as the practice of anaesthesia improves. For example, the AIMS reports supported advocacy for improved monitoring for our patients, but today all patients undergoing anaesthesia in our region today are monitored with pulse oximetry and capnography, and many other sophisticated monitors as well. It is also relevant that the reports are voluntary, so incident reporting of this type does not provide rates of occurrence for the problems reported. The increased uptake of electronic record-keeping may provide opportunities to emulate the aviation industry's approach to triangulation (discussed above) from different sources of information as a way of increasing the proportion of incidents reported.
On the other hand, the reports to WebAIRS do provide an overview of the problems that characterise anaesthesia in our region today. The simple fact that these incidents are still occurring in reasonably large numbers is in itself an important message. Yes, anaesthesia is almost certainly as safe in Australia and New Zealand as in any other country, and far safer than it used to be in years gone by, but we are still far short of achieving the mission of the APSF: that no patient should be harmed from anaesthesia. In our opinion, heathcare has more unpredictability than civil aviation and thus some of the challenges are different, but there is still much for us to learn from aviation in our approach to reporting and learning from incidents. In the end, improving safety in any complex activity requires a longterm commitment and depends on the ongoing aggregation of marginal gains 28, 29 . WebAIRS provides the means for anaesthetists in Australia and New Zealand to identify the opportunities for such gains.
